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Abstract
Can financial incentives be used to reduce cholesterol levels in high-risk patients? This randomized trial says
modest reductions can be achieved only by targeting incentives to both patients and physicians, not to one or
the other.
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KEY FINDINGS: 
Can financial incentives be used to reduce cholesterol levels in high-risk patients? This randomized trial says modest 
reductions can be achieved only by targeting incentives to both patients and physicians, not to one or the other. 
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Each patient in the three intervention groups was assigned 
a quarterly goal to reduce lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) 
levels, which should have been achievable if the patient was 
fully adherent to his or her prescribed medication. 
PCPs in the physician incentives group accrued quarterly 
payments of $256 for each enrolled patient who met the 
quarterly goal, paid semi-annually. PCPs in the patient 
incentives group received no payments; instead, their 
patients participated in an automatic daily lottery with 
eligibility based on having taken the statin the day before. 
PCPs and patients in the shared incentives group followed 
the same incentive structure as in the PCP or patient-specific 
groups but with payments of half the size. Total possible 
payouts were the same for all incentive groups. Physicians 
and patients in the control group received no goal-based 
incentives, but all participants received small participation 
payments. The interventions continued for 12 months, and 
patients were followed up for an additional three months. 
THE FINDINGS
Only patients in the shared physician-patient incentives 
group achieved reductions in LDL-C levels statistically 
different from those in the control group.
THE QUESTION
To whom should financial incentives be targeted to achieve 
a desired clinical or health outcome? Physician and patient 
incentives are becoming more common, but they are rarely 
combined, and effectiveness of these approaches is not 
well-established. Using insight from behavioral economics, 
a research team led by LDI Senior Fellows David Asch 
and Kevin Volpp sought to determine whether physician 
financial incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician 
and patient incentives are more effective in promoting 
medication adherence and reducing cholesterol levels of 
patients at high risk for cardiovascular disease. 
THE STUDY
The researchers randomly assigned 340 primary care 
physicians (PCPs) from three large primary care practices in 
the northeastern United States to one of four study groups: 
control, physician incentives, patient incentives, and shared 
physician-patient incentives. More than 1,500 patients, all 
at high risk of cardiovascular disease, participated and were 
allocated to the same group as their PCP.  
Patients received their prescribed daily dose of statins in 
an electronic pill bottle, which, when opened, wirelessly 
transmitted a signal to a web platform. 
of medication by PCPs and patient adherence to that 
medication. 
While the study points to the incentive structure that had 
the greatest relative impact, the improvements were modest 
and the authors stress that further information is needed to 
understand whether the approach represents good value. 
Further, one limitation of the study was a lack of a true 
“usual-care” control that did not receive electronic pill bottles. 
Patients in the control group received electronic pill bottles 
and may have been more adherent than is typical because they 
were under observation. Other limitations include a relatively 
small number of enrolled patients per physician, which limited 
the potential rewards for physicians and may have reduced 
their motivation to go after these awards. 
Asch DA, Troxel AB, Stewart WF, et al. Effect of Financial Incentives to 
Physicians, Patients, or Both on Lipid Levels: A Randomized Clinical Trial. 
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Source: JAMA. 2015;314(18):1926-1935. doi:10.1001/jama.2015.14850
After 12 months of the intervention, 49% of patients in the 
shared physician-patient incentives group had achieved their 
LDL-C goal compared with 40% in physician incentives, 
40% in patient incentives, and 36% in control. 
Although medication adherence was higher in the shared 
incentive and patient incentive groups, it was low across 
all the groups. However, patients who were already 
taking statins before the start of the study (less than half 
of participants) showed large increases in adherence with 
incentives. This suggests that the incentive was ineffective 
in promoting initiation of statin use in patients but effective 
in increasing adherence among those already taking statins. 
THE IMPLICATIONS
This trial is the first of its kind to thoroughly test physician, 
patient, and shared incentives of equivalent value, and is 
notable for incorporating several insights from behavioral 
economics: daily engagement, “regret” lotteries, a relatively 
high probability of a small reward and lower probability of a 
larger reward, and leveraging of loss aversion. 
These findings are important for what they reveal about 
what works and what does not work.  Neither physician 
nor patient incentives on their own lowered the LDL-C 
level significantly more than the control. The lack of 
effect of the physician-only intervention offers the first 
controlled evidence that adding these incentives to a fee-
for-service payment model may not improve medication-
related intermediate outcomes.  The authors suggest that the 
effectiveness of the shared incentives model makes sense 
with the LDL-C reduction likely driven by both provision    
